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1ARTICLE XV   DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
by Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.  The pace of the
AHG negotiations has quickened during the past year and there is now a clear political will to
see the negotiation of the Protocol completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review
Conference in 2001.    It is now evident that several Articles in the draft Protocol are now
largely agreed and will not develop significantly from their current form although a certain
amount of restructuring may be agreed at a later stage.
2.   In Evaluation Paper No 1 it was concluded1 that "the majority of the Articles in the draft
Protocol have now reached the stage when they have had multiple readings and are unlikely
to change significantly during the coming months as the negotiations enter the end-game.   It
is therefore timely to commence the production of a series of Evaluation Papers which will
consider Article by Article the current state of each Article of the Protocol."   This Evaluation
Paper continues this series by considering Article XV Duration and Withdrawal  on which
the AHG has made good progress with the current rolling text containing only three pairs of
square brackets.
Article XV




1. This Protocol shall remain in force so long as the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention of 1972 is in force.
2. Each State Party to this Protocol shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, the
right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to
the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall
give notice of such withdrawal to [the Depositary/ies] all other States Parties to the
Protocol, the Executive Council and the United Nations Security Council [6] months
in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
                                                
† Nicholas A. Sims is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of International Relations at
the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London  WC2A
2AE, UK.
1Graham S. Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol:  An Overall Evaluation, Evaluation Paper No. 1,
University of Bradford, July 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc
2United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part I), 30 July 1999, Geneva.
23. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Protocol shall not in any way affect its
obligations under other international legal instruments to which it is a party,
[particularly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993].
4. Any State Party that withdraws from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
of 1972 shall be deemed to have withdrawn from this Protocol, irrespective of
whether it has complied with the procedure set forth in paragraph 2 of this Article.
The Protocol shall cease to be in force for such a State on the same day as the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 ceases to be in force for it.
4.   The strikethrough version of Article XV provided3 by the FOC on Legal Issues for further
consideration has a number of proposed amendments as follows:
ARTICLE XV
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
1. This Protocol shall remain in force so long as the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention of 1972   Convention is in force.
2. Each State Party to this Protocol shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have
the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme national
interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to [the Depositary/ies] all other
States Parties to the Protocol, the Executive Council and the United Nations Security
Council [  6  ] months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme national interests.
3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Protocol shall not in any way affect its
obligations under other international legal instruments to which it is a party.
[particularly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993].
4. Any State Party that withdraws from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
of 1972 Convention shall be deemed to have withdrawn from this Protocol,
irrespective of whether it has complied with the procedure set forth in paragraph 2 of
this Article. The Protocol shall cease to be in force for such a State on the same day
as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 Convention ceases to be in
force for it.
Evaluation
                                                
3United Nations, Proposals for further consideration by the Friend of the Chair on Legal Issues, BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/FOC/22, 28 July 1999 in Annex IV of Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part II), 4 August 1999,
Geneva.
35.     It is useful in evaluating the Protocol Article XV language to consider this against a
background of the language on duration and withdrawal in the  BTWC as well as that in more
recent conventions and treaties such as that in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
6.   Article XIII of the BTWC4 which opened for signature in 1972 addresses duration and
withdrawal:
ARTICLE XIII
1.  This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty
have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject-matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States
Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
7.   The CWC language5 in Article XVI is as follows:
ARTICLE XVI DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States
Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security
Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way
affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any
relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
whilst the CTBT language6  in Article IX is closely similar:
                                                
4United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, General Assembly Resolution 2826
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
5Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Available on the web at
http://www.opcw.nl
6Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.   Available at http://www.ctbto.org/ctbto/pdf/cbten.pdf
4ARTICLE IX
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests.
3.       Withdrawal  shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all
other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations
Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary
event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.
8.  The first paragraph of the Protocol Article XV renders the duration of the Protocol
coterminous with that of the Convention, which itself has unlimited  duration (Article XIII.1
of the BTWC).
9.   The second paragraph is the withdrawal clause.   Leaving aside for a moment the
question of the length of notice, which is currently within square brackets, this clause has
similar language to that of Article XIII.2 of the BTWC,  of Article XVI.2 of the CWC and
Article IX.2 & 3 of the CTBT.   It recognizes the right of withdrawal as belonging to each
State Party in the exercise of its national sovereignty, but proceeds to set three conditions.   It
does this by limiting the permissible occasions for withdrawal to extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Protocol  which have jeopardized its supreme national
interests of its country.  [The bold shows the proposed FOC/22 change7 in the strikethrough
text]  This is understood as an attempt to preclude the potentially destructive effect on a treaty
of the international legal doctrine of Fundamental Change of Circumstances, if left
unconstrained, by introducing three tests:  of extra-ordinariness, treaty relevance and
magnitude (jeopardized its supreme national interests).   These three tests in combination
narrow the range of events which can properly be invoked by a State Party as justifying
withdrawal.
10.  The length of notice to be given is proposed, within square brackets, as 6 months.   This
is the same notice as in Article IX.3 of the CTBT.  It is double the 90 days specified in
Article XVI.2 of the CWC and the 3 months laid down in Article XIII.2 of the BTWC.   That
3 months provision was identical to and followed the precedents of the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (Article X. 1) and the 1971 Sea Bed Treaty (Article VIII).  Walter
Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp have written8 of the 90 days requirement in the CWC that:
                                                
7United Nations, Proposals for further consideration by the Friend of the Chair on Legal Issues, BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/FOC/22, 28 July 1999 in Annex IV of Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part II), 4 August 1999,
Geneva.
8Walter Krutzsch & Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994, p.248.
5The time span should enable States Parties either to try to convince the State Party in
question not to insist on its decision (for instance by providing additional assistance
against use or threat of use of chemical weapons) or to prepare individually or
collectively for measures adequate to cope with an adverse situation resulting from
such a withdrawal.
11.   In the case of the CWC, and of the BTWC, the withdrawal clause has not been put to the
test, but in one other treaty it has been.   The Democratic People's Republic of Korea invoked
Article X.1 of the NPT in March 1994 and suspended, but did not cancel, the implementation
of its withdrawal one day before the three months' notice would have expired.   At the 1995
Review and Extension Conference, and subsequently, it was regarded by the States Parties to
the NPT as having a unique status of indeterminacy somewhere between a Party and a Non-
Party to that treaty.   From this one case, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions about
length of notice:  about whether, for instance, the States Parties to the NPT would have been
able to organise a more effective collective response in 1994 if the DPRK had been required
to give 6 months' notice rather than 3, or whether the balance of incentives for the DPRK to
suspend, or proceed to, implementation of withdrawal would have been different.   Other
things being equal, however, a 6 months' notice requirement renders the Protocol marginally
stronger and is therefore to be recommended.
12.  The other element in Article XV.2 of the Protocol in square brackets relates to whether
the notice of such withdrawal should be given to [the Depositary/ies]  as well as to all other
States Parties to the Protocol, the Executive Council and the United Nations Security Council
.    It is interesting to note that there is no such requirement to notify the Depositaries in
Article XIII.2 of the BTWC or in Article X.1 of the NPT (which also had the UK, the Soviet
Union and the US as its three Depositaries).   Whilst both the CWC and the CTBT have the
requirement to notify the Depositary, it can be argued that such notification is only necessary
if the Depositary is the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as is the case with the CWC
and the CTBT, but is not necessary if the Depositaries are other States Parties.   In Evaluation
Paper No. X on Article XXII Depositary/ies 9 we have argued that the Depositary of the
Protocol should be the Secretary-General of the United Nations; consequently, the Protocol
text should read the Depositary .
13.  The third paragraph, once the unnecessary square brackets are removed, protects
international obligations under the three most closely related treaties, including the BTWC
itself, in the event of withdrawal from the Protocol by a State which remains a Party to the
BTWC.    However, in the strikethrough text10 prepared by the FOC for further consideration,
it is proposed to limit this paragraph to stating that The withdrawal of a State Party from this
Protocol shall not in any way affect its obligations under other international legal
instruments to which it is a party'  without  naming the three most closely related treaties.   It
may be thought that their naming in Article XI Relationship of the Protocol to the BTWC and
Other International Agreements  renders their naming here unnecessary.   However, the two
Articles address distinctly different situations.  Article XI is concerned with those States for
which the Protocol is in force, Article XV is concerned with those States for which the
                                                
9Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XXII:  Depositary/ies,  Evaluation Paper No. 7, University of
Bradford, September 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc
10United Nations, Proposals for further consideration by the Friend of the Chair on Legal Issues, BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/FOC/22, 28 July 1999 in Annex IV of Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part II), 4 August 1999,
Geneva.
6Protocol has ceased to be in force.  Protection of international legal obligations under the
1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention is at least as important to
emphasise in the latter situation as in the former.  So too is the continuing validity of state's
obligations under the BTWC itself.   Accordingly we recommend that the three treaties
remain in the text of Article XV.   A slight rearrangement of the wording would bring the
reference to the BTWC into conformity with the streamlined reference to the Convention
proposed elsewhere in the strikethrough text and ensure consistency within the strikethrough
text proposed for Article XV, thus:
3.   The withdrawal of a State Party from this Protocol shall not in any way affect  its
obligations under the Convention or other international legal instruments to which it
is a party, particularly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.
14.  The fourth paragraph provides for automatic withdrawal from the Protocol if a State
withdraws from the BTWC.  This is a logical corollary to the conditions for signature in
Article XVII and for accession in Article XIX, which limit participation in the Protocol to
States Parties to the BTWC.
15.   The other proposals made in the strikethrough text proposed by the FOC to streamline
the reference to the Convention and to insert national  in two places in paragraph 2 of the
Article are endorsed.
Strike-through text for Article XV
16.  Our view is that Article XV should have the remaining square brackets removed and




1. This Protocol shall remain in force so long as the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention of 1972   Convention is in force.
2. Each State Party to this Protocol shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have
the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme national
interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to [  the Depositary /ies] , all other
States Parties to the Protocol, the Executive Council and the United Nations Security
Council [  6  ] months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme national interests.
3.   The withdrawal of a State Party from this Protocol shall not in any way affect  its
obligations under the Convention or other international legal instruments to which it
is a party, particularly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.
4. Any State Party that withdraws from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
of 1972 Convention shall be deemed to have withdrawn from this Protocol,
7irrespective of whether it has complied with the procedure set forth in paragraph 2 of
this Article. The Protocol shall cease to be in force for such a State on the same day
as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 Convention ceases to be in
force for it.
